The contemporary global environment is complex and changing. A variety of threats to US national security require military formations proficient in missions across the spectrum of conflict-offense, defense, and stability. Strategy and doctrine direct proficiency in stability yet an offensive and defensive focused culture, maneuver brigade organizational structure, and related processes prevent this. Stability has historically been one of the Army's most prevalent missions and because it is likely to remain so, strategic and operational improvements must be made. At the strategic level, following the example of Army Transformation, TRADOC strategic leaders must align culture to strategy and doctrine using cultural embedding mechanisms. At the operational level units and training institutions must internally reorganize, adopt doctrinal stability procedures, and emphasize education. Failure to make these changes will result in units with narrow capability, unable to conduct the stability missions our strategy requires.
Stability Operations Policy and Doctrine Awaiting Implementation
if a standing army must be tolerated…it should be as useful as possible, and not merely in military ways.
-President Thomas Jefferson
Defense spending represents the greatest portion (25% 2012) of the U.S.
Federal budget.
2 Although shrinking, this spending will dominate budget allocations for the foreseeable future. When our civilian leaders demand a return on this taxpayer investment, the military-specifically the Army, must be ready to fight and win the conflicts we are presented rather than the ones we would choose. We are at a familiar moment in time, at the end of a period of prolonged conflict, trying to prepare for future contingencies. Consequentially, national strategy, policy, guidance, and doctrine direct the Army be prepared to perform missions across the spectrum of conflict. Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations (ULO), requires the Army to be able to conduct the core missions of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities. Some leaders and trainers believe we are proficient in stability operations and should focus on the lethal end of the spectrum (offense and defense). 3 This paper challenges that belief. It argues that to mitigate or defeat threats facing the US, the Army must improve its ability to conduct stability missions. While maintaining the ability to conduct offense and defense will always be critical, an inability to conduct stability will increasingly put US national security at risk. Although this has been acknowledged in national security policy and doctrine, stability remains inadequately addressed in the Army's generating force. Army culture, organization and processes 2 have greatly limited its ability to educate and train its brigade combat teams (BCTs) to conduct effective stability missions.
Stability Operations, the Contemporary Environment and Threats to U.S. National Security
In a world which has changed rapidly over the last decade, the Army endeavors to define its current and future operational environment (OE). Most contemporary studies describe a diverse milieu which poses varied security challenges for the US, and its allies. 4 In places like Syria, Congo or the Balkans, US land forces could be deployed as the lead element or in an advise and assist role to accomplish a variety of security tasks. Regardless of the mission, the end result would be to stabilize the area where they are deployed. Consequently, the Army must be prepared to mitigate a variety of threats. Noteworthy, these threats can't be defeated simply with offensive and defensive missions. The narrow scope of these missions only fosters the defeat of an enemy, not the stability of an area. Thus stability missions will be a critical-if not primary-component of future military operations. Acknowledging the reality of future environments rather than as we wish them to be must be the priority for shaping US military capabilities. Addressing this problem will require strategic leadership to shape culture and promote understanding of policy and strategy. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) must ensure compliance with policy and strategy through Army training institutions. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) must do the same with the generating force. Addressing culture and ensuring compliance with policy and strategy must be followed by the structural and procedural changes they require.
Consequences
To achieve what current strategy and policy direct, the Army must institute change. For example, the Army Chief of Staff, General Odierno directs, "the Army must develop new capabilities and adapt processes to reflect the broader range of requirements to ensure it is an agile, responsive, tailorable force…" Abiding by this guidance, BCTs must tailor organizational structure, establish relevant processes, and train and educate their personnel, while at the strategic level institutional training organizations complement these changes. Recent adaptations such as company intelligence support teams (COIST) and company level operations centers are examples of the force tailoring that must occur to meet a broad range of requirements outlined in policy and strategy.
In order to tailor a BCT for stability missions, DOTMLPF adjustments under organization, processes (doctrine), and education (training) are required. These were selected because they represent the most significant shortfalls that necessitated 6 augmentation and adjustments for stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. To illustrate force tailoring, an understanding of stability operations and the importance of understanding the operational environment (OE) is required.
Stability aims to create a condition so the local population regards the situation as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable. 15 Since these missions are populationcentric, they emphasize the "art" of war fighting which requires alternative approaches to adapt formations and tactics to achieve effects. Knowledge is primary and soldiers succeed by understanding human behavior models, religion, and foreign culture.
Leaders succeed by possessing knowledge of stability concepts and societal behavior theories so they may conduct maneuver suitably. Because these domains are so diverse, a single stove-piped organizational structure, process and method of training will not work. A fundamental prerequisite to creating and tailoring any process or restructuring units is to first understand the OE. Unlike offense and defense where the goal is to defeat, destroy or neutralize the enemy, understanding the OE for stability missions requires a unit to navigate through a complex web of socio-cultural factors to determine where root causes of instability originate.
A study by the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division (JCOA), J7, Joint
Staff, concluded "failure to understand the operational environment" was the number one lesson not learned from the last decade of war. This was the result of ineffective intelligence and BCT organization, processes, and training not focused on understanding the OE. Recognizing this, the Army responded by tailoring BCT organizations (augmentation and modularity), and adopting new processes (District Stability Framework). This helped but BCTs still struggled under their existing 7 organization and processes thus in most cases they were unable to determine root causes of instability or why an inferior enemy was gaining traction in their areas. would have a far better chance of success during stability missions. Though organizational changes will greatly assist a unit trying to achieve stability proficiency, it will also require procedures which complement these changes.
Procedures (Doctrine) Procedural inefficiencies can be overcome with two simple changes-improve bottom-up intelligence and use the DSF. Since stability operations are populationcentric, they require intelligence collection and analysis from the lowest levels of the formation to identify the local causes of instability. This intelligence, provided to higher headquarters, can provide commanders with a better understanding of the OE fostering more effective stability missions. As an example, the Khowst-Gardez road, a multimillion dollar project in southeastern Afghanistan, designed at division level to promote economic growth, actually created greater instability when the tribes along the road fought over resources, land, and associated road contracts. 17 A bottom-up process would have informed the unit that a road was not going to promote economic growth, only more instability. As a result the unit in the area was consumed by the tribal tensions and fighting and was not able to identify the real SOIs or stabilize the area. 18 To improve intelligence collection and analysis in Iraq and Afghanistan, COIST were developed. The Army embraced this concept and BCTs began to man and train these teams. However, COISTs were never given permanent manning authorizations or enduring institutional training. Some BCTs continue to field and train these teams but as Afghanistan transitions, they may disappear. Though COIST manning is an organizational issue, the bottom-up intelligence process depends on their survival.
To address this, the Army must assign the Intelligence Center of Excellence (COE) as the proponent for COIST doctrine and training. COIST training and operations must also have resident expertise at the CTCs. Commanders must identify, man and train COIST teams to exist and train permanently. COIST continuity would foster a foundational capability in each maneuver company to provide the indispensable bottom-driven intelligence needed in BCTs. To be effective, COIST survival must be complemented by a methodology that will deliver effects during stability missions. A useful methodology is the DSF.
The DSF, though doctrinal (ADP 3-07) and mandated by International Security Forces Afghanistan (ISAF), is little known or used across the Army. 19 The Army embedded DSF in doctrine but did not establish a pre-deployment training program for it. Not having used DSF before, commanders were averse to incorporating it into their processes during chaotic Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) pre-deployment periods. 20 Neither has DSF been incorporated in CTC Leader Training Programs (LTP) nor rotations (save JMRC in Europe). A DSF mobile training program was created by ISAF and directed to train units, but many BCTs either ignored this directive or used it to rationalize their pre-conceptions. 21 This situation is the result of the Army culture of lethality which causes commanders to selectively interpret or ignore guidance. Of the few units that embraced DSF, many placed it on the shoulders of small under resourced, non-lethal cells inside their organizations.
The District Stability Framework, created by the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) in partnership with DOD, was designed specifically for stability operations. Modeled using the targeting and military decision making process (MDMP), DSF advances these processes to help users identify SOIs through a local cultural lens, design operations to address them and monitor their effectiveness.
For example, using the doctrinal ASCOPE/PEMSII 22 population-focused assessment tool, DSF modifies it to provide the local relevance of each aspect of the OE. To illustrate DSF's value, consider the following example:
Using DSF in the Nawa District of Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 1 st Battalion, 5 th Marines in 2009 learned that the lack of phone coverage was one of the local population's principle grievances. Using the DSF Tactical Conflict Survey the unit discovered phone coverage fostered a sense of stability because it allowed people to quickly find out about the security situation in neighboring areas and/or if attacks had injured family members. Based on this information, the battalion and its Afghan National Security Force partners started providing security for the local cell phone towers. This effort led to an increase in the number of tips about enemy activity. Even more significantly, it increased the number of people who believed the area was stable. The Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Bill McCollough noted "without DSF… we would never have known about this concern, or done anything about it. 23 To fix this shortfall, the Intelligence COE must establish a cadre of DSF trainers, embed this POI into COIST training, and create introductory and advanced DSF education and training modules for basic, career, and intermediate courses. BCTs must train their leaders and staffs and implement this methodology during situational training. CTCs must build observer controller capacity to coach and train units and staffs on the DSF.
Education (Training)
As highlighted, unit and training institution guidance and POIs provide insufficient stability direction which is caused by a culture centered on lethality. Furthermore, because of the differences between offense, defense, and stability, a tailored training approach is required. BCTs and training institutions can approach this through the following, 1) a balanced approach between offense, defense and stability training and education, 2) doctrinal training management, 3) emphasis on education over training. A balanced approach will allow stability to occupy more of BCT focused training periods so commanders can adjust their organization and exercise their units and staffs.
Doctrinal training management will force a task "cross-walk" between doctrine and unit training plans to ensure compliance. Education will equip leaders with a conceptual framework to think their way through complex stability problems.
To achieve balance, BCT commanders must approach stability training at home station the same way they do offense and defense. This means dedicating greater portions of focused training periods to stability and applying the same leader involvement and oversight. Using doctrinal training management, following the principles presented in ADP 7-0 (Training Units and Developing Leaders) and ADP 3-07 (Stability), BCT commanders must develop leader, soldier and unit stability training programs that achieve proficiency. Staff exercises (STAFFEX) and STX training will work the cognitive skills required of leaders and staffs. Building population-centric scenarios to help exercise DSF will add rigor to stability training and increase proficiency.
Along with this training approach, commanders must place a greater emphasis on education. Education will be vital to understanding instability in future operational environments. Since training is currently dominated by offense and defense, education has become secondary.
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation 350-70 (Army
Learning Policy and Systems) defines training as a process geared toward increasing the capability of individuals and units to perform a specified task. 24 Education produces leaders and organizations who know how to think, apply knowledge and solve problems. 25 Stated another way, consider being trained as a pilot to fly a plane or being educated as an aeronautical engineer to know why the plane flies, and then being able to improve its design so that it will fly better. 26 In stability operations, soldiers and leaders will be required to mitigate complex societal problems in constantly changing environments. Therefore, education must take precedence over training.
Education in the social sciences should be included in training, to build internal stability mission capability. Commanders should select individuals inside their organization with the capability to grasp these theories and implement them. This can be done inexpensively identifying personnel inside the organization with these types of experiences or degrees, allowing officers and NCOs to take college classes at community colleges or bringing in professionals to conduct leader training.
Translating policy and strategy through the same lethal lens, Army training centers of excellence (COE) do not treat stability as a core military mission. Aside from some basic instruction on language, culture, and lingering COIN training, there is no stability training in basic, career and NCO professional development courses.
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Because of this, leaders arrive to units with little or no stability education or training. To remedy this, each COE must establish stability POIs which should include historical cases, vignettes, and exercises to foster learning.
Lastly, CTCs must tailor rotations to better facilitate stability proficiency. Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE) rotations, though evolving, have yet to demonstrate an adequate approach to stability. This is evident in rotational training plans and leader training programs (LTP). 28 Currently, force on force periods move through offense and defense (or reverse) sequentially while stability is presented throughout the rotation. This causes stability to drop in priority as rotational units (RTU) face significant conventional threats from the opposition force (OPFOR). Though it is realistic that a BCT would conduct offense, defense, and stability simultaneously, the complexity of the training scenario prevents proper assessment of stability proficiency.
The Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Germany observed, "Although we created a scenario that allowed for significant play for all three missions, the scenariodefending against an invasion and then executing offensive operations to push out the invading force-overwhelmed the RTU." 29 To fix this requires an adjustment to the operational environment (OE) which will allow the RTU to focus on stability as a BCT main effort. Following rotations, after action reviews (AARs) must include stability so that units have feedback and recommendations on how they can improve their proficiency.
Along with this adjustment, LTP programs which only dedicate 1% of their total POI to stability, must achieve balance in offense, defense and stability education and training. 30 This imbalance is a result of LTP cadre (JRTC and NTC) which are primarily In the standardized, orderly nature of a hierarchy, cultural change will not come easy. The work of Geert Hofstede presents, Uncertainty Avoidance as an attribute influencing cultural change. This attribute describes how ambiguous situations are threatening to organizations to which rules and orders are preferred. 34 Leaders in hierarchical organizations who lack stability competence may commit uncertainty avoidance which will cause them to mistranslate or ignore strategy and doctrine.
Along with these cultural attributes and behaviors, Colin Gray offers Twelve
Characteristics of the American Way of War to help understand the military mindset.
Three of these, technologically dependent, firepower focused and profoundly regular are particularly relevant because they represent a mindset which could be averse to the associated changes required for stability. procedures also facilitate change. 39 The experience of Generals Shinseki and Schoomaker provide two examples of successful Army change using these embedding mechanisms.
Witnessing a heavy Army in the Balkans, slow to deploy, move, and adapt and realizing the diversity of the future threat environment, General Shinseki began his embedding process to change the Army announcing "Army Transformation" in 1999. 40 He faced a conservative Army bureaucracy, resting on its laurels from its successes in Desert Storm. 41 To overcome this he established the Army Transformation Cell at Fort Lewis, Washington to measure and control progress. Army Transformation organizational design centered on the Stryker brigade concept as a bridge to a future force. He personally carried his "change" message to the Army through his travels and engagements with soldiers and leaders.
General Schoomaker, having to grow the force and provide modular capability to combatant commanders, announced to Congress and the Army, Modular
Reorganization. 42 To make this succeed he formed "Task Force Modularity" under TRADOC to pay attention to, control and measure this effort. 43 Having to overcome similar cultural obstacles, he engaged in a campaign to embed a "joint-expeditionary mindset" with speeches, professional articles, congressional testimony and direct oversight of the effort. The modular brigade was the organizational design born from this effort, possessing increased capabilities. 
Conclusion
The problems presented in this paper are well within the capability of the Army to address, even amidst shrinking budgets. Policy, strategy, and doctrine speak clearly of the requirement to maintain stability operations as a core competency. However, if the Army forgets its recent past and shifts its focus to offense and defense it risks arriving on the next battlefield unprepared. The newly formed Decisive Action Training Environment and TRADOC's strategic adaptability provide a unique opportunity to institute changes forcing units to tailor their organization and processes to achieve stability proficiency. Through self-assessment, a reflection of recent struggles with stability missions and strategic leader involvement the Army can fulfill its obligation to national security policy, strategy, and doctrine and achieve stability proficiency.
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